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ABSTRACT
The Byzantine agreement problem is considered to be a core prob-
lem in distributed systems. For example, Byzantine agreement
is needed to build a blockchain, a totally ordered log of records.
Blockchains are asynchronous distributed systems, fault-tolerant
against Byzantine nodes.
In the literature, the asynchronous byzantine agreement problem
is studied in a fully connected network model where every node
can directly send messages to every other node. This assumption is
questionable in many real-world environments. In the reality, nodes
might need to communicate by means of an incomplete network,
and Byzantine nodes might not forward messages. Furthermore,
Byzantine nodes might not behave correctly and, for example, cor-
rupt messages. Therefore, in order to truly understand Byzantine
Agreement, we need both ingredients: asynchrony and incomplete
communication networks.
In this paper, we study the asynchronous Byzantine agreement
problem in incomplete networks. A classic result by Danny Dolev
proved that in a distributed system with n nodes in the presence of
f Byzantine nodes, the vertex connectivity of the system communi-
cation graph should be at least (2f +1). While Dolev’s result was for
synchronous deterministic systems, we demonstrate that the same
bound also holds for asynchronous randomized systems. We show
that the bound is tight by presenting a randomized algorithm, and a
matching lower bound. This algorithm is based on a protocol which
allows other Byzantine agreement algorithms to be implemented
in incomplete networks.
Index Term— Blockchain, Byzantine agreement, communication
network, randomized algorithms
1 INTRODUCTION
Byzantine agreement is at the heart of understanding distributed
systems. Most existing work about byzantine agreement assumes
a fully connected network, i.e., every node in the distributed sys-
tem can directly communicate with every other node. In reality,
however, nodes are often connected by an unreliable network, such
as the Internet. To communicate, two nodes must exchange mes-
sages, and these messages will be forwarded by relay nodes, which
are controlled by third parties. Relay nodes may be compromised,
even Byzantine. A relay node may for instance decide to corrupt
or simply drop messages. This is particularly true in world-scale
distributed systems, and world-scale systems (blockchains) are
predominantly responsible for the current reawakened interest
in byzantine agreement.
The Byzantine agreement problem has also been studied in a
network. Already as early as 1982, Danny Dolev [7] showed that two
conditions are both necessary and sufficient to achieve Byzantine
agreement in an n-node system: As usual, we need the number of
Byzantine nodes f to obey f < n3 ; In addition, the vertex connec-
tivity of the communication graph cannot be less than (2f + 1).
Dolev’s fundamental work had only considered the synchronous
model, i.e., all communication happened in synchronous rounds.
Moreover, the result was restricted to deterministic algorithms.
In world-scale systems, it is difficult to argue for synchronous
communication. Consequentially, the focus has shifted away from
synchronous systems towards asynchronous systems. Even though
some form of synchrony is usually needed for liveness, safety is
guaranteed even in completely asynchronous systems. This is the
case for permissionless blockchain systems such as Bitcoin[17], and
also for permissioned systems such as PBFT[6].
Figure 1: An incomplete network with 7 large node clus-
ters and 14 additional nodes. The 3 solid nodes are well-
connected; if these 3 nodes are Byzantine, there may split
the graph into small disconnected subgrpahs.
In this paper, we study the effect of incomplete networks on
byzantine agreement in asynchronous distributed systems. We have
a system with n nodes, each with a binary input. At most f nodes,
with f < n3 , are Byzantine. The nodes are interconnected by an
incomplete network, which can be represented by an undirected
graphG = (VG ,EG ). An example of such an incomplete network is
shown in Figure 1.
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It was proven in [10] that there is no deterministic algorithm
which can solve Byzantine agreement in an asynchronous dis-
tributed system, with f = 1, i.e., a single Byzantine node, or
even a crash node. However, randomization helps [2], and con-
sequently our algorithm will be randomized as well. More precisely,
we present a randomized algorithm that solves the Byzantine agree-
ment problem in asynchronous distributed systems with high prob-
ability, as long as the vertex connectivity of the network G is at
least (2f + 1). We also show that this bound is tight by proving that
there is no randomized algorithm which can solve the asynchro-
nous Byzantine agreement problem when the vertex connectivity
ofG is less than (2f + 1). In other words, we demonstrate that with
the help of randomization, Dolev’s original bounds [7] also hold in
asynchronous networks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section,
we give an overview of related work. Section 3 defines the model
that we study in this paper. In Section 4, we present a randomized
algorithm for solving the Byzantine agreement in our model. We
give the necessary condition for solving the Byzantine agreement
problem under the model in Section 5. We conclude our work in
Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we discuss all the known related work on Byzantine
agreement which are studied in asynchronous distributed systems
and incomplete networks.
The Byzantine agreement problem is essential in distributed sys-
tems. It was proved in [10] that there is no deterministic algorithm
that can solve the Byzantine agreement problem in the presence
of even a single Byzantine node. Later Lamport et al. [13] proved
that if the number of Byzantine nodes is larger than or equal to
n
3 , it is impossible for any algorithm to solve the Byzantine agree-
ment problem with n nodes. The first randomized algorithm was
proposed by Ben-Or [2]. With this algorithm, all correct nodes will
decide on the same output with high probability even when a con-
stant fraction of nodes is faulty. Bracha [3] improved the previous
result and proposed a randomized algorithm that solves the asyn-
chronous Byzantine agreement problem if less than one third of
nodes are Byzantine.
The connectivity conditions of communication graphs have been
studied right when the topic emerged. Danny Dolev [7] studied
Byzantine agreement in synchronous distributed systems among n
nodes in the presence of f Byzantine nodes and figured out that it
is possible to achieve Byzantine agreement in networks with vertex
connectivity at least (2f + 1) and n ≥ 3f + 1. Later Dolev et al.
and Abraham et al.[1, 8] showed that the approximate Byzantine
agreement problem can be solved in synchronous networks if and
only if (2f + 1) vertex connectivity is given.
Recently, there are a series of results under the local broadcast
model. In contrast to the orthodox point-to-point communication
model, under the local broadcast model, all neighbors of a trans-
mitting node are guaranteed to receive identical messages. A lower
connectivity requirement under the local broadcast model in the
synchronous setting was obtained in [11]. In the presence of f
Byzantine nodes, the following conditions are both necessary and
sufficient. The communication graph G with n nodes has mini-
mum degree 2f andG is (
⌊
3f
2 + 1
⌋
)-connected. The local broadcast
model in the asynchronous distributed system was considered in
[18]. They show that it is necessary to have (2f + 1) vertex connec-
tivity for solving the approximate Byzantine agreement problem.
This bound keeps the same as the bound of the point-to-point
communication model given in [8].
We are the first to study the exact Byzantine agreement problem
in asynchronous distributed systems, as the comparison between
our work and related work shown in Figure 2. In contrast to results
in [8, 18], which consider approximate Byzantine agreement, we
study the exact Byzantine agreement problem. To obtain an approxi-
mate Byzantine agreement, nodes are only required to obtain values
that are close to each other, rather than identical. However, in many
real-world systems, such as financial systems, one requires precise
values. Any minor deviation may accumulate and cause serious
consequences. Other work[7, 11] solved exact Byzantine agreement
solely in synchronous distributed systems by deterministic algo-
rithms. Unfortunately, assuming synchrony is often not realistic
in many world-scale systems. The impossibility for deterministic
algorithms to solve the asynchronous Byzantine agreement prob-
lem inspires us to propose a randomized algorithm that achieves
Byzantine agreement on undirected incomplete (2f + 1)-connected
communication graphs in asynchronous distributed systems with
n nodes in the presence f Byzantine nodes.
3 MODEL AND NOTATION
3.1 Distributed System
Given a distributed system with n nodes, the communication net-
work between nodes is represented by an undirected graph G =
(VG ,EG ). Nodesu andv can send messages to each other if and only
if they are adjacent in G, i.e., (u,v) ∈ EG . We will use the terms of
node and vertex interchangeably in this paper. The communication
channels between nodes are authenticated. Nodes can recognize
who is the sender of the message when they receive a message.
Messages cannot be modified by any third party if messages are
delivered via the authenticated channel between adjacent nodes.
However, relay nodes on paths between nodes have the ability to
modify messages or even generate fake messages.
3.2 System parameters
The system we study in this paper has two critical parameters.
Asynchronous systems or synchronous systems: In a syn-
chronous system, there is an upper bound on the message delivery
delay from one node to another which is known by all nodes. Nodes
take actions in rounds. Each round takes a constant period of time
which is sufficient for nodes to send messages, do local computa-
tions and accept incoming messages. In asynchronous distributed
systems, the message delay from one node to another has no finite
upper bound. Messages may be delayed for arbitrary time periods.
However, messages will eventually be delivered. Nodes take actions
when they are activated by events, such as messages arriving. In
this paper, we study asynchronous systems.
Broadcast transmission or point-to-point transmission: if
the transmission mechanism is point-to-point, nodes can send a
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Figure 2: Comparison with previous work.
message to at most one neighbor at a time. If the transmission
mechanism is broadcast, node u sends identical messages to all of
its neighbors at the same time. In this paper we study the point-to-
point transmission mechanism.
3.3 Byzantine agreement
There are Byzantine nodes in distributed systems, which may be-
have arbitrarily. A Byzantine node may corrupt or simply drop
messages. The system requires agreement among all nodes in the
system, e.g. a total order of blocks in blockchain systems. Because
there are general reduction protocols from multivalued agreement
to binary agreement[16, 19], we focus on the Byzantine binary
agreement problem in this paper.
Every node has a binary input, and we want correct nodes decide
on a binary value which satisfies the following conditions,
Agreement (exact): all correct nodes decide for the same value.
Agreement (approximate): for any preassigned ϵ > 0, all cor-
rect nodes decide with outputs that are within ϵ of each other.
Termination (deterministic): all correct nodes terminate in a
finite time.
Termination (probabilistic): the probability that a correct node
is undecided after r steps approaches 0 as r approaches infinity.
Validity: the decision value must be the input value of a node.
In contrast to the exact agreement, the approximate agreement
is not valid for many real-world distributed systems. Thus, we focus
on the exact agreement problem in this paper.
Because it is impossible for any deterministic algorithm to solve
exact Byzantine agreement problem in asynchronous distributed
systems in the presence of a single faulty node, we study random-
ized algorithms with the probabilistic termination condition. There
exists a source that generates random numbers in randomized
algorithms. Nodes have access to these random numbers during ex-
ecutions. The agreement made by nodes is based on their input and
these random values. Therefore, with the same input, the behavior
of nodes can be different because of these random numbers.
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3.4 Connectivity
A path P in an undirected graph G = (VG ,EG ) is a finite sequence
of edges which joins a sequence of distinct vertices. A uv-path Puv
is a path between nodes u and v . Nodes u and v are endpoints of
Puv . Nodes other than u and v in Puv are internal nodes of Puv .
If there is a path between every node pair u,v ∈ VG , then G is
connected. G is k-connected if G is still connected after removing
k − 1 arbitrary nodes. There is a classic result for k-connected
graphs:
Theorem 1 (Menger’s Theorem[14]). An undirected graph G =
(VG ,EG ) is k-connected if and only if for any two nodes u,v ∈ VG ,
there are k node disjoint uv-paths. Two uv-paths are disjoint if and
only if they do not have any identical internal node.
4 SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
In this section, we present an algorithm that solves the asynchro-
nous Byzantine agreement problem with high probability on G =
(VG ,EG ), whenG is (2f +1)-connected. We will introduce this algo-
rithm in three levels, top to bottom. Lower level protocols provide
fundamental functions for constructing higher level protocols.
The primary protocol is discussed in Subsection 4.1, which is the
top level of our algorithm. It is an f -resilient agreement protocol
that describes the behavior of nodes, including how nodes commu-
nicate with each other and how they decide on the agreement.
The middle level of our algorithm is a broadcast algorithm, as the
primary f -resilient agreement protocol above requires a broadcast
communication mechanism. However, our model is built on the
point-to-point communication mechanism, which does not meet
the requirement. We use an authenticated double-echo broadcast
algorithm to fix this gap. We discuss this broadcast algorithm in
Subsection 4.2. With this broadcast algorithm, identical messages
will be delivered to all nodes.
The bottom level of our algorithm is an algorithm that allows any
node pair to communicate with each other in incomplete networks.
The middle level algorithm, i.e., the authenticated double-echo
algorithm is implemented in systems where nodes can directly
communicate with each other. Therefore, we design an asynchro-
nous purifying algorithm to effectuate the broadcast algorithm in
our model. In Subsection 4.3, Subsection 4.4 and Subsection 4.5, we
present the asynchronous purifying algorithm, which ensures that
the message delivery between any node pair is correct in an in-
complete communication network with the presence of Byzantine
nodes. We explain how nodes send messages, transmit messages as
internal nodes on a path and accept messages respectively.
4.1 Byzantine agreement Algorithm
The top level protocol is an f -resilient agreement protocol in asyn-
chronous systems in the presence of f < n3 Byzantine nodes, which
is derived from the probabilistic protocol in [3]. In asynchronous
systems, there is no global real-time clock. Nodes take actions when
they receive messages from other nodes.
Nodes take actions in phases. We present the protocol of phase i
in Algorithm 1. The algorithm starts in phase 0. The initial value of
vu is the input of nodeu anddecisionu is initialized as⊥. We assume
that nodes communicate with each other by reliable broadcast
Algorithm 1 Code for node u, Phase(i), i = 0, 1, ...
1: round 1
2: broadcast(source = u, round = 3i + 1, value = vu )
3: wait until validate (n − f ) messages of round 3i + 1
4: if more than n−f2 messages of round 3i + 1
5: have the same value vm then
6: vu ← vm
7: end if
8: end round 1
9:
10: round 2
11: broadcast (source = u, round = 3i + 2, value = vu )
12: wait until validate (n − f ) messages of round 3i + 2
13: if more than n2 messages have the same value vm
14: other than vu then
15: vu ← vm
16: ready ← True
17: else
18: ready ← False
19: end if
20: end round 2
21:
22: round 3
23: if ready then
24: broadcast (source = u, round = 3i + 3,
25: value = vu )
26: else
27: broadcast (source = u, round = 3i + 3,
28: value = ∅)
29: end if
30: wait until validate (n − f ) messages of round 3i + 3
31: if more than 2f messages have the same value
32: vm , ∅ then
33: vu ← vm
34: decisionu ← vu
35: for j ← 1 to 3 do
36: broadcast (source = u, round = 3(i + 1) + j,
37: value = vu )
38: end for
39: terminate
40: else
41: if more than f messages have the same value
42: vm then
43: vu ← vm
44: else
45: vu ← coin_toss (0 or 1 with probability 12 )
46: end if
47: end if
48: end round 3
49:
50: go to Phase(i + 1)
channels in this subsection. If a message is delivered to one node,
it is also delivered to other nodes in the system.
4
In each phase, nodeu takes actions in three rounds. Nodeu keeps
a value at the beginning of each phase and broadcasts this value to
other nodes in the first round. After validating (n − f ) messages
of the first round from other nodes, node u sets its value as the
majority of these (n− f )messages and enters in the second round. In
the second round, node u broadcasts the new value and waits until
validating (n − f ) messages of the second round from other nodes.
If there is a value which is accepted in more than n2 messages, then
u sends this value at the beginning of the third round. Otherwise,
node u sends an empty message in the third round. Node u waits
until validating (n − f ) messages of the third round from other
nodes. If more than 2f messages have the same value, thenu makes
the decision. Node u terminates the algorithm when it decides on
decisionu . Before termination, it broadcasts three messages for the
next phase. If less than 2f messages but more than f messages
have the same value, then u does not change vu and keeps vu in
the next phase. If there is no value exists in more than f messages,
node u takes a coin toss to get a random value and keeps this value
in the next phase.
This protocol solves the Byzantine agreement problem because
it satisfies validity, exact agreement, and probabilistic termination.
We discuss the correctness of this protocol in these three aspects.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 solves the Byzantine agreement prob-
lem in asynchronous distributed systems in the presence of f < n3
Byzantine nodes.
Lemma 1. Algorithm 1 satisfies the validity property.
Proof. There are two possible situations of node inputs in the
system. In the first situation, all correct nodes have the same input
value. In the second situation, correct nodes have different input
values.
If all correct nodes have the same input v , then all of them will
receive more than n−f2 > f messages of round 1 with the identical
value v . In round 2, vu does not change because Byzantine nodes
cannot create more than n2 copies of malicious messages. For the
same reason, all correct nodes will decide on v in round 3.
If nodes have different inputs, no matter which value they agree
on, the validity property is always satisfied. □
Lemma 2. Algorithm 1 satisfies the exact agreement property.
Proof. First, we claim that two correct nodes u and w won’t
decide on different values in round 3k + 3. Suppose not: then node
u decides on 0 while nodew decides on 1 in round 3k + 3. Because
both of them validate more than 2f messages, there are two correct
nodes u ′, andw ′ get ready with value 0 and value 1 in round 3k + 2,
i.e., ready = TRUE, respectively. Node u ′ validates more than n2
messages with value 0 in round 3k + 2 and node u ′ validates more
than n2 messages with value 1 in round 3k+2. There must be a node
broadcasting two messages with value 0 and value 1 separately in
round 3k + 2, which is impossible. Thus, correct nodes decide on
the same value in the same round.
Suppose that node u decide on 0 in round 3k + 3, it validates
(2f + 1)messages with value 0. Hence, other correct nodes validate
at least (f + 1) messages of these (2f + 1) messages which are
validated by u. Because node u will continue broadcasting correct
messages with value 0 in phase k + 1. All correct nodes have the
same value from round 3(k + 1)+ 1 and all of them will decide on 0
in round 3(k + 1) + 3.
□
Lemma 3. Algorithm 1 satisfies the probabilistic termination prop-
erty.
Proof. Let us consider node actions in phase k . All nodes are
still active in phase k . There are four possible situations that a
correct node u can be found in round 3k + 3.
In the first situation, if node u validates more than 2f messages
with value v in round 3k + 3, apparently, all correct nodes will
decide on value v in round 3(k + 1) + 3 with probability 1.
In the second situation, node u validates more than f messages
with value v in round 3k + 3. Other correct nodes will not decide
on the value v ′ , v or directly set its value to v ′. Otherwise, with
the same argument in the proof of Lemma 2, there must be a node
broadcasting two messages with value 0 and value 1 respectively
in round 3k + 2, which is impossible. Thus, the probability that
other correct nodes start with value v in phase k + 1 is greater than
2−(n−f ).
In the third situation, node u validates less than f messages with
value v in round 3k + 3. Other correct nodes might validate v but
won’t validate a value other than v . The probability that all correct
nodes start with value v in phase k + 1 is greater than 2−(n−f ).
In the fourth situation, node u has not validated a message with
value v . Other correct nodes have not validated more than f mes-
sages with value v . Otherwise, node u will validate v at least once.
Therefore, all correct nodes toss coins and the probability that all
correct nodes start with value v in phase k + 1 is 2−(n−f ).
In all of these situations, algorithms terminates in phasek+1with
probability greater than or equal to 2−(n−f ). Thus, the probability
that the algorithm never terminates is P(never terminatinд) ≤
limk→∞(1 − 2−(n−f ))k = 0.
□
4.2 Byzantine Reliable Broadcast
In our model, we assume that the transmission mechanism between
nodes is point-to-point, which does not meet the requirement of the
top level protocol in Subsection A; we use multiple broadcast(·) in
Algorithm 1. We seek for a reliable broadcast to fix this gap. In this
subsection, we discuss the details of a Byzantine reliable broadcast
algorithm that helps us to implement the algorithm in our model.
The Byzantine reliable broadcast allows nodes to broadcast in
identical messagem to all nodes in the system. Nodes will validate
the message as the response of the broadcast. A Byzantine reliable
broadcast algorithm satisfies five properties[5],
Validity: if a correct node u broadcasts a messagem, then every
correct node eventually validatesm.
Noduplication: every correct node validates messagem at most
once in the broadcast of messagem.
Integrity: if a correct node w validates a messagem from an-
other correct nodeu, thenm was broadcast byu beforew validating
m.
Consistency: if a correct node w validates a message m and
another correct nodew ′ validates a messagem′ in the same round,
thenm =m′.
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Totality: if a correct nodew validates a messagem, then other
correct nodes eventually validatem.
We follow the authenticated double echo broadcast algorithm
in[3]. The algorithm consists of three parts: broadcasting messages,
echoing messages, and validating messages, which are shown in
Algorithm 2, Algorithm 3, and Algorithm 4, respectively. Note that
we assume full communication capability among nodes in this
subsection, but it is not true in our model, we will explain how to
solve this problem in Subsection C, Subsection D and Subsection E.
Algorithm 2 Broadcast Message m = (source = u, round =
k, value = vu ), Code for node u
1: Send (m, from = u, label = initial) to all nodes in the system.
Algorithm 2 indicates how node u broadcasts a messagem. It
sendsm to all other nodes in the system with a initial label.
Algorithm 3 Echo Messagem = (source = u, round = k, value =
vu ), Code for nodew
1: echow ←⊥N
2: readyw ←⊥N
3: upon accept message (m, from = u, label = initial)
4: send (m, from = w, label = echo) to other nodes.
5: end upon
6:
7: upon accept message (m = (source = u, round = k, value =
vu ), from = v, label = echo)
8: if (source = u, round = k, ...) < echow [v] then
9: echow [v] ← echow [v] ∪m
10: end if
11: end upon
12:
13: upon #(m ∈ echow [p],∀p ∈ VG ) > n+f2 andm ,⊥
14: if have not sent (m, from = w, label = ready) then
15: send (m, from = w, label = ready)
16: to other nodes.
17: end if
18: end upon
19:
20: upon accept message (m = (source = u, round = k, value =
vu ), from = v, label = ready)
21: if (source = u, round = k, ...) < readyw [v] then
22: readyw [v] ← readyw [v] ∪m
23: end if
24: end upon
25:
26: upon #(m ∈ readyw [p],∀p ∈ VG ) > f andm ,⊥
27: if have not sent (m, from = w, label = ready) then
28: send (m, from = w, label = ready)
29: to other nodes.
30: end if
31: end upon
The algorithm is called authenticated double-echo broadcast
because it has two echo steps, which are indicated in Algorithm 3.
In the first step, nodew sends messagem with echo label to other
nodes when it accepts the messagem with initial label from u. In
the second step,w sends messagem with ready label to other nodes
when it accepts more than n+f2 copies of the messagem with echo
label from other nodes or when it accepts more than f copies of
the messagem with ready label from other nodes.
Algorithm 4 Validate Message m = (source = u, round =
k, value = vu ), Code for nodew
1: Val ← ∅
2: upon #(readyw [p] =m,∀p ∈ VG ) > 2f andm ,⊥
3: if (source = u, round = k, ...) < Val then
4: validatem as a message broadcast by u
5: in round k
6: Val ← Val ∪m
7: end if
8: end upon
We introduce the validating step in Algorithm 4. The message
m is validated by nodew when it accepts more than 2f copies of
the messagem with ready label from other nodes. This message is
stored in the set Val . Set Val is an empty set at the beginning of
the algorithm.
Theorem 3. The authenticated double-echo broadcast algorithm
is a Byzantine reliable broadcast.
Proof. We prove Theorem 3 by indicating that the authenti-
cated double-echo broadcast algorithm satisfies five properties of
the Byzantine reliable broadcast in Lemma 4, Lemma 5, Lemma 6,
Lemma 7 and Lemma 8. □
Lemma 4. The authenticated double-echo broadcast algorithm
satisfies the validity property.
Proof. If a correct node u broadcasts a messagem, then other
correct nodes will accept it and send a echo message to others nodes
in the system. Because f < n3 , we have n − f > n+f2 and f < n+f2 .
Correct nodes will accept at least n+f2 + 1 echo copies of message
m and send a ready message to others.
For the same reason, correct nodes will eventually accept at least
(2f + 1) copies of messagem with ready label from other correct
nodes. Hence, messagem will be validated by every correct node
eventually. □
Lemma 5. The authenticated double-echo broadcast algorithm
satisfies the no duplication property.
Proof. The no duplication property is intuitive because m is
validated by nodew if it is not in the setVal .m will be added toVal
after validation by nodew . Hence every correct node only validates
m once. □
Lemma 6. The authenticated double-echo broadcast algorithm
satisfies the integrity property.
Proof. If a correct node sends a messagem with ready label to
other nodes, it needs at least n+f2 + 1 > f accepted echo messages
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or (f +1) accepted ready messages. Byzantine nodes have no ability
to realize these two events.
A correct node needs at least (2f + 1) accepted ready copies of
a messagem to validatem. It is impossible for Byzantine nodes to
create (2f + 1) fake messages with ready label because there are
less than f Byzantine nodes in the system. Thus, messagem was
broadcast from another node previously. □
Lemma 7. The authenticated double-echo broadcast algorithm
satisfies the consistency property.
Proof. The integrity property of the authenticated double-echo
broadcast algorithm implies that m and m′ are all broadcast by
node u previously. Because node u only broadcasts one message in
a round, we must havem =m′. This message was broadcast by u
in this broadcast round. □
Lemma 8. The authenticated double-echo broadcast algorithm
satisfies the totality property.
Proof. If a correct node u validates a messagem, it has already
accepted at least (2f +1)messages with ready label. At least (f +1)
of them are sent by correct nodes.
Thus, every correct node will accept at least (f + 1) messages
with a ready label from other correct nodes eventually. Because
the authenticated double-echo broadcast algorithm requires a node
to send a message ofm with ready label when it accepts (f + 1)
messages with ready label.
For this reason, every correct node will send a ready message of
m to each other. Every correct node will validatem eventually. □
4.3 Send Messages
The authenticated double-echo broadcast algorithmwas initially im-
plemented in the system where nodes can communicate with each
other directly. However, in our model, communication is restricted
because the network is incomplete. The authenticated channels
are only between adjacent nodes of the network. Danny Dolev
introduced the Purifying algorithm, which has been used to solve
communication problems on incomplete graphs[7]. However, this
algorithm only works in synchronous systems.
In this subsection, Subsection D and Subsection E, we proposed
an asynchronous purifying algorithm that fixes the communication
gap in the system where not every pair of nodes can send and
receive messages directly. The algorithm has the following prop-
erties such that the correctness of the authenticated double-echo
broadcast algorithm is guaranteed.
Validity: if a correct nodeu sends amessagem to another correct
nodew , then nodew eventually acceptsm.
No duplication: if a correct node u sends a messagem to an-
other correct nodew , then nodew only acceptsm once.
Integrity: if a correct nodew accepts a messagem from another
correct node u, then m was broadcast by node u before node w
accepting messagem.
We introduce our algorithm by giving an example of message
delivery, i.e., node u sends a messagem to node w while node v
is an internal node of a path between u andw . The asynchronous
purifying algorithm consists of three parts: sending m from the
starting node u, transmittingm via a path by an intermediate node
v , and acceptingm at the destination nodew , these steps are intro-
duced respectively in this subsection, Subsection D and Subsection
E.
Figure 3: Node u sends a messagem to node w via a path in-
cluding node v.
Algorithm 5 demonstrates how node u acts when u decides to
send a messagem to nodew . As we discussed in Subsection B, node
u sends a messagem with a label. When node u sends a message
m to its neighbors, it sends the messagem together with the label,
its own identifier u, and the message flooding path. Initially, the
flooding path of the message is empty, which is represented by ⊥.
Algorithm 5 Send (m, from = u, label = l) to node w , Code for
node u
1: send message (m, from = u, label = l , path =⊥) to u .neiдhbor
4.4 Transmit Messages
Because the communication graph is not complete, messages cannot
be directly delivered to the destination. Internal nodes on paths
between message source node and message destination node are
responsible for transmitting messages. In our example, when node
v receives a message m, from = u, label = l , path = Π from a
neighbor t , it will send this message to its neighbors other than
t and store it in its local memory. The details are presented in
Algorithm 6.
Node v first checks that if the message flooding path Π includes
itself. If so, v discards this message. This step ensures that node v
does not accept and send any duplicated message. Node v discards
a message if the message flooding path is incorrect. If the message
is not discarded, then nodev stores this message, message label and
the message flooding path in its local memory and sends (source =
u, round = k, value = vu , path = Π − t) to all neighbors except t .
4.5 Accept Messages
At nodew , it accepts messagem if it receives enough copies ofm
with the same label via disjoint flooding paths. The part of accepting
messages is shown in Algorithm 7. Node w accepts a messagem
from node u with label l when it receives more than f identical
copies with label l via disjoint flooding paths. This message is stored
in Acpt . Acpt is initialized as an empty set at the beginning of the
whole algorithm.
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Algorithm 6 Transmit (m, from = u, label = l , path = Π), Code
for node v
1: upon receive (m, from = u, label = l , path = Π) from t
2: if v ∈ Π then
3: ignore the message
4: end if
5: if u < Π then
6: ignore the message
7: end if
8: store (m, from = u, label = l , path = Π − t)
9: in memory listMem
10: send (m, from = u, label = l , path = Π − t)
11: to v .neiдhbor \ t
12: end upon
Algorithm 7 Accept (m, from = u, label = l), Code for nodew
1: Acpt ← ∅
2: upon #((m, from = u, label = l , ...) ∈ Mem) > f and their
flooding paths are disjoint
3: if (m, from = u, label = l) < Acpt then
4: acceptm as a message from node u with label l
5: Acpt ← Acpt ∪ (m, from = u, label = l)
6: end if
7: end upon
Theorem 4. The asynchronous purifying algorithm satisfies the
validity, no duplication, and integrity properties, which guarantees
the correctness of the authenticated double-echo broadcast algorithm
in our model.
Proof. The no duplication property is intuitive because (m, from =
u, label = l) is accepted if it is not in Acpt .
We prove the correctness of this asynchronous purifying algo-
rithm from two perspectives. We fist prove the validity property in
Lemma 9 by showing that every messagem sent by node u will be
accepted by nodew eventually. Then we prove that if a messagem
is accepted by nodew , it must be sent by node u first to verify the
integrity property in Lemma 10.
□
Lemma 9. When a correct node u broadcasts a messagem with
label l , another correct node w will receive at least (f + 1) correct
copies via disjoint flooding paths if the communication graph G has
(2f + 1) vertex connectivity.
Proof. Because the connectivity of the communication graph
G is (2f + 1), there are at least (2f + 1) disjoint paths between
any node pair. Therefore, there are at least (2f + 1) disjoint paths
between the source node u and the destination nodew .
There are at most f byzantine nodes in the system. These nodes
can only appear in at most f disjoint paths between u andw . Thus,
there are at least (f + 1) disjoint paths only contains correct nodes
between u andw .
Correct messages will be transmitted through these paths from
nodeu to nodew . Hence, nodew will receive at least (f +1) correct
copies via disjoint flooding paths, and messagem with label l from
node u will be accepted by nodew eventually. □
Lemma 10. Every messagem with label l which is validated in the
asynchronous purifying algorithm is a correct message.
Proof. We prove that Byzantine nodes cannot manipulate vali-
dated messages.
Consider s is the last Byzantine node in a path P between node u
and nodew . We claim that if a messagem with label l is delivered
to w successfully through P , then s must appear in the flooding
path of this message because node s is recorded in the flooding path
by the next correct node after node s in P . This information will
not be modified by other nodes in the graph because s is the last
Byzantine node in P .
Byzantine nodes appear in at most f disjoint paths. Thus, at
most f copies ofm with label l can be modified by them. However,
we need (f + 1) identical copies to validate messagem with label
l . Therefore, there must be at least one copy ofm is correct. This
message is transmitted through a path without any Byzantine node.
There is at least one correct copy of m with label l accepted
by node w when m with label l is validated by node w . Hence,
messagem is a correct message sent by node u if it is validated in
the asynchronous purifying algorithm. □
Until now, we accomplished the randomized protocol that solves
the Byzantine agreement problem with the presence of f Byzantine
nodes in our model.
Theorem 5. If the communication graph G of the asynchronous
distributed system with n nodes and f < n3 Byzantine nodes have(2f + 1) vertex connectivity, then our algorithm solves the asynchro-
nous Byzantine agreement problem, that all correct nodes decide on
the same value with high probability.
5 NECESSARY CONDITIONS
In the previous section, we presented a randomized algorithm that
solves the Byzantine agreement problem with n nodes with the
presence of f Byzantine nodes in our model where the connectivity
of the communication graph is at least (2f + 1). This algorithm
gives us a upper bound of the vertex connectivity requirement for
the communication graph.
In this section, we prove that this bound is tight. There does not
exist an algorithm that can solve the asynchronous Byzantine agree-
ment problem with high probability when the vertex connectivity
of G is less than (2f + 1).
Theorem 6. If the communication graph G of the asynchronous
distributed system with n nodes and f < n3 Byzantine nodes does
not have (2f + 1) vertex connectivity, then it is impossible to find an
algorithm that solves the asynchronous Byzantine agreement problem,
i.e., all correct nodes decide on the same value.
There are two different requirements in Theorem 6. We prove
Theorem 6 with Lemma 11 and Lemma 12.
Lemma 11 ([4]). If there exists an algorithm that solves the Byzan-
tine agreement problem in our model with n nodes with the presence
of f Byzantine nodes, then n ≥ 3f + 1.
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Lemma 12. If there exists an algorithm that solves the Byzantine
agreement problem in our model with n nodes on the communication
graph G in the presence of f Byzantine nodes, then G is (2f + 1)-
connected.
Lemma 11 was proved in [4]. It is impossible for randomized
algorithms to solve the asynchronous Byzantine agreement problem
if the number of Byzantine nodes f is greater than or equal to n3 .
We prove Lemma 12 by using the state machine based approach,
which is similar to the technique in [4, 8, 9]. We discuss an example
that it is impossible for any randomized algorithm to solve the
Byzantine agreement problem with high probability. Correct nodes
will decide on different values.
Proof for Lemma 12. Suppose for the sake contradiction, there
exists an algorithmA that solves the asynchronous Byzantine agree-
ment problem with high probability in our model with n nodes,
tolerating at most f < n3 Byzantine faulty nodes, communicating
on the communication graphG = (VG ,EG ), whereG is not (2f +1)-
connected. A outlines a procedure Au for each node u ∈ VG that
describes state transitions of u.
We can find a vertex cut of G and the size of the vertex cut is
less than (2f + 1). Let C be the vertex cut ofG and |C | ≤ 2f . Other
verticesVG \C are partitioned into two non-empty vertex sets X ,Y ,
such that X and Y are disconnected in G \C .
Because |C | ≤ 2f , we can partition C into two disjoint vertex
sets R and T , i.e., C = R ∪T and 0 < |R | ≤ f and 0 < |T | ≤ f . The
structure of network G is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Network structure of G.
Let us consider three executions E1,E2, and E3 on G. We run
algorithm A in these three executions.
In the first execution E1, nodes in T are Byzantine while other
nodes in X ,Y ,R are correct with input 0.
In the second execution E2, nodes in T are Byzantine, and other
nodes in X ,Y ,R are correct with input 1.
In the third execution E3, nodes in X ,Y ,T are correct, while
nodes in R play Byzantine strategies. We input 0 to nodes of X and
input 1 to nodes in Y and T .
It is easy for us to figure out the outputs of nodes in E1 and E2.
Because of the validity of A, all correct nodes in E1 decide on 0, no
matter how Byzantine nodes act. For the same reason, all correct
nodes in E2 agree on 1.
However, it is not intuitivewhat is the output of nodes in the third
execution E3. We will explain that correct nodes in E3 will output
different values if Byzantine nodes in R play specific strategies. To
understand the behavior of nodes in E3, we introduce the fourth
execution E4 on another graph H .
We construct a network H = (VH ,EH ) based on G. For each
node u ∈ VG , there are two copies of u, i.e., u0,u1 ∈ VH . Thus, VH
can be partitioned into 8 vertex sets: (X0,Y0,R0,T0,X1,Y1,R1,T1).
If (u,v) ∈ EG and u,v are in the same vertex set, then we copy
(u,v) twice in EH , such that (u0,v0) ∈ EH , (u1,v1) ∈ EH . If (u,v) <
EG , then there is no edge between (u0,v0) and (u1,v1).
If (u,v) ∈ EG and u,v are not in the same vertex set, we build
connections according to the following rules.
• Ifu ∈ R,v ∈ T and (u,v) ∈ EG , then (u0,v0) ∈ EH , (u1,v1) ∈
EH .
• Ifu ∈ X ,v ∈ R and (u,v) ∈ EG , then (u0,v0) ∈ EH , (u1,v1) ∈
EH .
• Ifu ∈ Y ,v ∈ R and (u,v) ∈ EG , then (u0,v0) ∈ EH , (u1,v1) ∈
EH .
• Ifu ∈ Y ,v ∈ T and (u,v) ∈ EG , then (u0,v0) ∈ EH , (u1,v1) ∈
EH .
• Ifu ∈ X ,v ∈ T and (u,v) ∈ EG , then (u1,v0) ∈ EH , (u0,v1) ∈
EH .
We give the structure of H in Figure 5. Edges within vertex sets
are not displayed, while edges between vertex sets are represented
by a single edge.
E4 is an execution on H as follows. Each node pair u0,u1 ∈ VH
runs Au , which is the same algorithm protocol as u ∈ VG runs.
Nodes inX0,Y0,R0,T0 have initial input 0 and nodes inX1,Y1,R1,T1
have initial input 1. All nodes are correct.
To understand the output of nodes in E3, we first discuss the
output of nodes in E4. We start from nodes in X0,Y0,R0 in E4. We
claim that the behavior of X0,Y0,R0 in E4 is modelled by X ,Y ,R in
E1.
Let us consider strategies of Byzantine nodes in T in E1. Each
node u ∈ T in E1 can play a mixed strategy of the actions of (u0 ∈
T0,u1 ∈ T1) in E4. It considers itself as a combination of u0 and
u1 in E4. It reacts to nodes in X as the same as the reaction of u1
to nodes in X0 and reacts to nodes in Y and R as the same as the
reaction of u0 to nodes in Y0,R0.
As we discussed before, no matter how nodes in T behavior, the
output of nodes in X ,Y ,R in E1 is 0. Because nodes in X0,Y0,R0 in
E4 are in the same environment, have the same input, and run the
same algorithm as nodes in X ,Y ,R in E1, they will also decide on 0
eventually. This simulation is shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 5: Network structure of H to run execution E4.
For the same reason, nodes in X1,Y1,R1 decide on 1 eventually
in E4. We show the simulation of nodes in X1,Y1,R1 in E4 in Figure
7.
Each Byzantine nodeu ∈ T in E2 considers itself as a combination
ofu0 andu1 in E4. It reacts to nodes inX as the same as the reaction
of u0 to nodes in X1 and reacts to nodes in Y and R as the same
as the reaction of u1 to nodes in Y1,R1. No matter how nodes in T
behave, the output of nodes in X ,Y ,R in E2 is 1. Because nodes in
X1,Y1,R1 in E4 are in the same environment, have the same input
and run the same algorithm as nodes in X ,Y ,R in E2, they will also
decide on 1 eventually.
Based on previous analysis, we can design Byzantine strategies
for nodes in R in E3. Then nodes in X , Y , and T will decide on
different values eventually. Each node u ∈ R plays a mixed strategy
of actions of u0 ∈ R0 and u1 ∈ R1 in E4. It reacts to nodes in X as
the same as the reaction of u0 to nodes in X0 and reacts to nodes in
Y and T as the same as the reaction of u1 to nodes in Y1,T1. This
simulation is shown in Figure 8.
X0,Y1,T1 in E4 and X ,Y ,T in E3 have the same input, the same
algorithm procedure, and the same environment. Hence, nodes inX
decide on 0, and nodes in Y decide on 1 eventually in E3. This result
indicates that A cannot achieve the Byzantine agreement in E3,
which contradicts the agreement property ofA and our assumption.
□
In Lemma 11 and Lemma 12, we prove that (2f + 1) vertex
connectivity is a necessary condition for solving the asynchronous
Byzantine agreement problem in an incomplete network with n
nodes in the presence of f < n3 Byzantine nodes.
Figure 6: The behavior of nodes in E1 and nodes in E4. Green
nodes are Byzantine nodes in E1. Tv copies behavior of T1 to
X0 andT0 to Y0,R0. Nodes in X ,Y ,R decide on 0 eventually in
E1 while nodes in X0,Y0,R0 decide on 0 eventually in E4.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we investigate the Byzantine agreement problem in the
asynchronous distributed system with restricted communication.
Compare to previous work, we are the first to study the classical
Byzantine agreement problem in a more realistic problem in world-
scale distributed systems, i.e., blockchain systems.
We prove that following conditions are necessary and sufficient
to achieve Byzantine agreement among n nodes with the presence
of f Byzantine nodes: the communication graph has (2f +1)-vertex
connectivity and the number of Byzantine nodes f is less than n3 .
We also present a randomized algorithm that solves the exact Byzan-
tine agreement problem on incomplete graphs in asynchronous
systems.
Beyond these contribution, we propose a three-layer framework
that solves the asynchronous Byzantine agreement problem in in-
complete networks. The bottom layer is a strong protocol which
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Figure 7: The behavior of nodes in E2 and nodes in E4. Green
nodes are Byzantine nodes in E2. Tv copies behavior of T0
to X1 and T1 to Y1,R1. Nodes in X ,Y ,R deiced on 1 with high
probability in E2 while nodes in X1,Y1,R1 deiced on 1 with
high probability in E4.
allows other algorithms [15] which solve the asynchronous Byzan-
tine agreement problem to be implemented in incomplete networks.
One might hope that some classic synchronizers can help. How-
ever, classic synchronizers cannot deal with Byzantine nodes. There
are algorithms [12] that solve the Byzantine synchronization, how-
ever, only in complete graphs, with additional assumptions.
To build a byzantine-tolerant synchronizer in an incomplete
network seems to be an interesting problem, and we believe that
our paper could be a stepping stone to understanding that problem.
Thoughwe cannot claim that we directly solve the problem, because
the Byzantine clock synchronization problem can be considered as
a Byzantine agreement problem with specified conditions.
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